Thawing the Frozen Formalism: The Difference Between Observables and
  What We Observe by Anderson, Arlen
ar
X
iv
:g
r-q
c/
92
11
02
8v
1 
 2
5 
N
ov
 1
99
2
Thawing the Frozen Formalism:
The Difference Between Observables
and What We Observe
Essay for the Festschrift of Dieter Brill
Arlen Anderson∗
Blackett Laboratory
Imperial College
Prince Consort Rd.
London SW7 2BZ England.
Nov. 23, 1992
Imperial/TP/92-93/09
gr-qc/9211028
Abstract
In a parametrized and constrained Hamiltonian system, an observ-
able is an operator which commutes with all (first-class) constraints,
including the super-Hamiltonian. The problem of the frozen formalism
is to explain how dynamics is possible when all observables are con-
stants of the motion. An explicit model of a measurement-interaction
in a parametrized Hamiltonian system is used to elucidate the rela-
tionship between three definitions of observables—as something one
observes, as self-adjoint operators, and as operators which commute
with all of the constraints. There is no inconsistency in the frozen for-
malism when the measurement process is properly understood. The
projection operator description of measurement is criticized as an
over-idealization which treats measurement as instantaneous and non-
destructive. A more careful description of measurement necessarily
involves interactions of non-vanishing duration. This is a first step
towards a more even-handed treatment of space and time in quantum
mechanics.
∗arley@physics.mcgill.ca
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There is a special talent in being able to ask simple questions whose
answers reach deeply into our understanding of physics. Dieter is one of the
people with this talent, and many was the time when I thought the answer
to one of his questions was nearly at hand, only to lose it on meeting an
unexpected conceptual pitfall. Each time, I had come to realize that if only
I could answer the question, there were several interlocking issues I would
understand more clearly. In this essay, I will address such a question posed
to me by others sharing Dieter’s talent:
What is the difference between an observable and what we ob-
serve?
This question arises in the context of parametrized Hamiltonian systems,
of which canonical quantum gravity is perhaps the most famous example. It is
posed to resolve the following paradox: For constrained Hamiltonian systems,
an observable is defined as an operator which commutes (weakly) with all
of the (first-class) constraints. In the parametrized canonical formalism, the
super-Hamiltonian H describing the evolution of states is itself a constraint.
Thus, all observables must commute with the super-Hamiltonian, and so they
are all constants of motion. Where then are the dynamics that we see, if not
in the observables? This is the problem of the frozen formalism[Fro57-70,
Rov89-91, Kuc92].
In the context of quantum gravity, the problem of the frozen formalism
is closely linked with the problem of interpreting the wavefunction of the
universe and the problem of time. Two proposed solutions to the prob-
lem of time—Rovelli’s evolving constants of the motion[Rov89-91] and the
conditional probability interpretation of Page and Wootters[PaW83-93]—
intimately involve observables which commute with the super-Hamiltonian,
and each claims to recover dynamics. These proposals have been strongly
criticized by Kuchar[Kuc92], who notes that there is a problem with the
frozen formalism even for the parametrized Newtonian particle.
In this essay, I shall not address the problem of time but will focus on the
simpler case of the Newtonian particle. My intention is to reconcile the dif-
ferent conceptions, mathematical and physical, that we have of observables.
This will involve a recitation of measurement theory to establish the connec-
tion between the physical and the mathematical. Essential features of both
the Rovelli and the Page-Wootters approaches will appear in my discussion
as aspects of a careful understanding of observables and how we use them.
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There is a general consensus that to discuss the wavefunction of the uni-
verse one must adopt a post-Everett interpretation of quantum theory in
which the observer is treated as part of the full quantum system. I shall
take this position for parametrized Hamiltonian systems as well. Insistence
that the measurement process must be explicitly modelled will lead to a
sharp criticism of the conventional description of measurement in terms of
projection operators. A simple model measurement, related to one originally
discussed by von Neumann[vNe55], will clarify the role of observables in the
description of measurements. No incompatibility between dynamics and ob-
servables which are constants of the motion will be found. With further
work, I believe that my discussion can be extended to answer some of the
criticisms of Kuchar of the Rovelli and the Page-Wootters proposals on the
problem of time.
Before beginning the analysis of observables, return to the formulation of
the problem of the frozen formalism. To be assured the problem doesn’t lie in
the assumptions, consider each of the hypotheses leading up to it. The stated
definition of an observable is a sensible one as the following argument shows.
In a constrained Hamiltonian system, the set of (first-class) constraints {Ci}
(i = 1, . . . , N) define a subspace in the full Hilbert space of an unconstrained
system. A state Ψ in this subspace satisfies the constraint equations CiΨ = 0.
When Ψ is acted upon by the observable A, one requires that the result
AΨ remain in the constrained subspace. The condition for this is [A, Ci] =
fi(C1, . . . , CN) because then
CiAΨ = −[A, Ci]Ψ = −fi(C1, . . . , CN )Ψ = 0.
If one were to weaken the definition of an observable by not requiring that
it commute with the super-Hamiltonian, as is sometimes done[Kuc92], then
one must deal with the difficult problem of operators whose action takes one
out of one’s Hilbert space. This is not an adequate strategy for dealing with
the problem of the frozen formalism; it trades one problem for a harder one.
If the difficulty is not in this definition of an observable, perhaps it lies in
the fact the super-Hamiltonian is a constraint. Constraints are often a conse-
quence of a symmetry underlying the theory. In the ADM canonical quanti-
zation of gravity, it is well-known that invariance of the theory under space-
time diffeomorphisms makes the super-Hamiltonian a constraint. In the
parametrized canonical formulation of quantum mechanics, reparametriza-
tion invariance of the theory makes the super-Hamiltonian a constraint. In
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both cases, the symmetry making the super-Hamiltonian a constraint is a
physically motivated symmetry which is not to be given up lightly.
The problem of the frozen formalism is thus a real one, at least in so far
as it reflects a weakness in our understanding. It does not however prevent
one from just using the familiar machinery of quantum mechanics. For this
reason, it is most often consigned to the limbo of “peculiarities of the quan-
tum formalism,” and is either dismissed as a problem in semantics or simply
not addressed.
There is without doubt a semantic component to the problem. In com-
mon usage, the word “observable” has the connotation “something which
can be observed.” In ordinary quantum mechanics, it is defined as a self-
adjoint operator with complete spectrum. In parametrized and constrained
quantum mechanics, it is defined as an operator, not necessarily self-adjoint,
which commutes with all of the constraints. The task is to distinguish these
meanings. In so doing, we shall find that the problem of the frozen formalism
is more subtle than confusing one word with three meanings. It will hinge
on how we describe physical measurements in the mathematical formalism
of quantum mechanics. I will give an explication of the problem by way of a
few examples. These will show that there is no problem with working in the
frozen formalism: there are both constant observables and dynamics within
the wavefunction of the universe.
The essential property of an observable in both its mathematical defini-
tions is that it has an associated (complete) collection of eigenstates with
corresponding eigenvalues. The significance of this is that states can be
characterized by the eigenvalues of a collection of commuting observables.
The eigenvalues are the quantum numbers of the state. In the parametrized
formalism, these eigenvalues characterize the state throughout its entire evo-
lution. This is why they are constants of the motion. If an operator does not
commute with the super-Hamiltonian constraint, its eigenstates are not in
the constrained Hilbert space and are then of no use for representing states
in the constrained Hilbert space.
Because the eigenstates of observables are assumed to be complete, one
may represent states as superpositions of eigenstates. The coefficients in the
superposition will be constant. It is not necessary to know the observables
of which the full state is the eigenstate, though they can be constructed if it
is desired.
To firmly establish this perspective on observables, consider the para-
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metrized free particle with the super-Hamiltonian
H = p0 + p
2
1. (1)
Physical states |Ψ〉 are those which satisfy the super-Hamiltonian constraint
HΨ = 0. (2)
The operator p1 commutes with the super-Hamiltonian and is an observable.
Its associated eigenstates may be labelled by the eigenvalue k, where
p1|k〉1 = k|k〉1,
and, in the coordinate representation (assuming the canonical commutation
relations [q0, p0] = i, [q1, p1] = i), they are
〈q1, q0|k〉1 =
1
(2pi)1/2
eikq1−ik
2q0 . (3)
The operator q1 does not commute with the super-Hamiltonian and is not
an observable. In particular the state q1|k〉1 does not satisfy the super-
Hamiltonian constraint.
An operator closely related to q1 which is an observable is
q1t = e
−ip2
1
(q0−t)q1e
ip2
1
(q0−t) = q1 − 2p1(q0 − t). (4)
This is the observable which is equal to q1 at time q0 = t. It is one of
Rovelli’s “evolving constants of the motion”[Rov89-91]. Its eigenstates are
characterized by
q1t|x〉1 = x|x〉1.
In the coordinate representation, this is
〈q1, q0|x〉1 = (4pii(q0 − t))
−1/2ei(q1−x)
2/4(q0−t). (5)
This may be recognized as the Green’s function for the free particle, which
reduces to δ(q1 − x) as q0 → t. (The states are normalized using the usual
inner product with respect to q1, but this won’t be discussed here.)
A Gaussian superposition of momentum eigenstates can be formed by
|g; k, a〉1 = (pia/2)
−1/4
∫
dke−(k−k)
2/a|k〉1. (6)
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This has the coordinate representation
〈q1, q0|g; k, a〉1 = (2pia)
−1/4(iq0 + 1/a)
−1/2 exp(−k
2
/a) exp(
i(q1 − 2ik/a)
2
4(q0 − i/a)
).
An observable of which this state is an eigenstate is found to be
G = q1 − 2p1(q0 − i/a), (7)
and the state has eigenvalue 2ik/a. Note that G is not self-adjoint in the
usual inner product and its eigenvalue is not real. One expects that this
means that it is not physically observable, but to confirm this requires a
discussion of measurement.
Measurement theory in the foundation of quantum mechanics has been
discussed exhaustively over the past sixty years. To put the use of observables
as self-adjoint operators in context, it is necessary to reiterate the litany. I
want to emphasize the central role of projection operators in the conventional
approach. In contrast, I want to draw attention to an argument from a new
perspective compelling the use of a post-Everett description of measurement
in which both system and observing apparatus appear explicitly.
In ordinary quantum mechanics, observables as self-adjoint operators play
a central role, again through their eigenstates. The conventional description
of measurement is the following: If one intends to measure a particular ob-
servable, one decomposes the state of the system into a superposition of
eigenstates of that observable. The eigenvalues of these eigenstates of the
observable are interpreted as the possible outcomes of the measurement.
Since the observables are self-adjoint, the eigenvalues, and hence the out-
comes of measurement, are necessarily real. The probabilities for each of the
outcomes are given by the square-modulus of the coefficients in the superpo-
sition. When the measurement is complete, the state of the system is in an
eigenstate of the observable.
This procedure is so ingrained in our understanding of quantum me-
chanics that one easily forgets that it is a theoretical construct and not
the measurement process itself. The procedure is primarily based on two
assumptions[Dir58]: 1) measurement of a state gives a particular result with
certainty if and only if the system is in an eigenstate of the observable be-
ing measured, and the result is the eigenvalue of that eigenstate; 2) from
“physical continuity,” after a measurement is made, if that measurement is
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immediately repeated, the same outcome must be obtained with certainty,
and, hence, by 1), the measurement must put the system into an eigenstate
of the observable. These two assumptions characterize measurements, dis-
tinguishing them from other interactions, and are thus the fundamental tie
between the physically observed and the mathematically observable, between
measurement outcomes and eigenstates of operators. Few would doubt the
validity of the assumptions. I do not claim that the procedure does not work,
but rather that it works too well.
Let us call this description of measurement “the projection procedure,”
as one projects the initial state onto the eigenstates of the observable being
measured. This projection procedure neatly summarizes the results of mea-
surement, but does so at the cost of neglecting a description of the process by
which the measurement is made. It is as if an external agent is able to effect
a measurement on the system without need of introducing any apparatus:
suddenly, the measurement is done. The description is wholly isolated. Only
the system is present, and the measurement has direct access to its state.
Unfortunately, we do not share this luxury of direct access to states. By
necessity, we must always employ intermediaries to investigate the state of a
system.
A question that we are accustomed to ask in quantum mechanics is
“What is the probability density that the momentum of particle-1
in state |Ψ〉1 is k?”
Suppose the state |Ψ〉1 is the gaussian superposition of momentum eigen-
states (6) in the example above. The question inquires directly about the
state of particle-1, and, in the projection procedure, the question is mean-
ingful and has the familiar answer (pia/2)−1/2e−2(k−k)
2/a. This is not however
an entirely sensible question in the context of a system described by a super-
Hamiltonian constraint. To verify the answer, we must conduct an experi-
ment. The state solving the super-Hamiltonian constraint is the wavefunction
of the universe and contains, along with everything else, all measurements
and their outcomes. In fact, no measurements were ever made. The question
has no truth value because its answer can be neither confirmed nor denied.
To address the question, additional subsystems must be introduced which
interact with particle-1 to produce the measurement. For the purposes of
theory, these additional subsystems may be hypothetical, as we need not
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do every experiment we contemplate, but we must augment the hypoth-
esized super-Hamiltonian as if the experiment were to be performed. In
the event that it is, we can then expect to confirm or deny our theoretical
result. This treatment of the super-Hamiltonian carries an important res-
onance with Bohr’s insistence that reality is determined by the full experi-
mental arrangement[Boh35]: the choice of experiments determines the super-
Hamiltonian; the super-Hamiltonian (plus initial conditions) determines the
wavefunction of the universe and hence reality.
An essential consequence of this is that, to understand the measurement
process properly, one must model the interaction. It is not enough to add
apparatus subsystems to the super-Hamiltonian if one continues to treat mea-
surement as a black box which spontaneously changes the combined system
and apparatus state from an uncorrelated to a correlated superposition. This
is essentially still the projection procedure, albeit without the final selection
of a particular term from the correlated superposition.
Before investigating such a model explicitly, consider the characteristics
it must possess. Our goal is to understand the relation between observables
as self-adjoint operators and physical measurements. As the correspondence
between them is made through the assumptions underlying the projection
procedure, we desire a model which is as close to the projection procedure
as possible while being more specific about the details of the interaction. In
particular, we require that a measurement of a chosen observable return a
result which distinguishes between different eigenstates of the observable and
that it have the property that if the measurement is immediately repeated,
the same result will be found with certainty. This type of model was dis-
cussed by von Neumann[vNe55] and plays an important role in the Everett
interpretation[DeG73]. I will discuss it again to emphasize certain features.
If one has an isolated state being observed without apparatus, as in the
projection procedure, the only quantity which distinguishes between eigen-
states of an observable are their eigenvalues. This is why a measurement in
the projection procedure must return the eigenvalue of the eigenstate. In a
more general setting, in which the state of one subsystem interacts with an-
other to perform a measurement, the result need only be a (non-degenerate)
correlation of the states of the observing subsystem with the eigenstates of
the observable in the observed subsystem. This correlation allows one to
infer the state of one system from the state of the other. Since the eigen-
states of the observed subsystem are characterized by their eigenvalues, one
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may say that the measurement has returned the eigenvalue, in the sense that
the eigenvalue can be inferred from knowledge of the state of the observing
subsystem. This is however an abstraction: the eigenvalue is not an extant
physical quantity. The physical result of a measurement is the correlation of
the states of subsystems.
The second criterion—that if the measurement is immediately repeated,
the same result is obtained with certainty—is a requirement that the mea-
surement be non-destructive[DeG73]. That is, if the observed subsystem is
in an eigenstate of the observable, this eigenstate must be preserved after the
interaction, so that it may be measured again and found to give the same re-
sult. This rules out, as measurements, interactions which correlate the state
of the observing subsystem with the state of the observed system before the
interaction but leave it disturbed after the interaction. As one might expect,
this restricts the interaction terms that may be classified as measurements
in the projection procedure sense. This is significant because it reveals that
the projection procedure is an idealization of the process of measurement.
There are interactions which are considered measurements in experimental
practice that are not measurements in this sense.
A further idealization of the process of measurement in the projection
procedure is that it is instantaneous. This feature is not retained in the
model system: necessarily all measurements implemented by interaction re-
quire finite duration. The implications of this regarding observables will be
discussed below. I remark here that this is a profound departure from the
projection procedure in both its Copenhagen and Everett incarnations. It
has been lamented[Sch35, vNe55, Kuc81] that one of the most serious fail-
ings of the quantum mechanical formalism, especially from the perspective
of relativity, is the fact that measurements take place at a precise instant of
time. This is where this begins to change. Measurements as projections, and
as results computed from expectation values, take place at a precise instant
of time. Measurements as interactions require duration.
In the post-Everett view, where the outcome of a measurement is a corre-
lation between subsystems, the second criterion is a question of conditional
probability. One confirms that it is satisfied by using the Page-Wootters
interpretation[PaW83-93]. One requires two observing subsystems. Sequen-
tially, each interacts with the observed subsystem establishing correlation
with the observed subsystem. The question is then posed: given the result
of the first of the measurement, is the probability certain that the result of
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the second is the same? The answer is yes, by construction. When the first
observing subsystem interacts with the observed subsystem, it establishes a
correlation which distinguishes the different eigenstates of the observed sub-
system. In the manner in which one handles conditional probabilities, one
discards all the states except for the one whose correlation reflects the given
result of the first measurement. The second observing subsystem then in-
teracts only with an eigenstate of the observable, not with a superposition,
and establishes a correlation which is the same as that of the first subsystem.
The only thing that could go wrong would be if the observed subsystem is
not still in an eigenstate of the observable, but the measurement-interaction
is chosen so that this cannot happen.
Consider a model of a measurement of the momentum p1 of particle-1 in
the example above. We introduce a second free particle, particle-2, which
interacts with particle-1 through the measurement-interaction (cf. [vNe55])
HI = a(q0)p1q2. (8)
Since the interaction couples to the observable, it will preserve the eigenstates
of the observable through the measurement-interaction. Here, a(q0) is a
smooth function which vanishes outside the interval 0 < q0 < T and for
which
∫ T
0 a(q
′
0)dq
′
0 = 1. It can be viewed as a phenomenological summary
of a more detailed process by which particle-1 and particle-2 are brought
together to interact. The full super-Hamiltonian is then
H = p0 + p
2
1 + p
2
2 + a(q0)p1q2. (9)
This problem can be exactly solved, using for example canonical trans-
formations [And92] (cf. also [Kuc80]). Define
A(q0) =


0 q0 < 0∫ q0
0 a(q
′
0)dq
′
0 0 ≤ q0 ≤ T.
1 q0 > T
(10)
The super-Hamiltonian H with the interaction term is related to the super-
Hamiltonian H0 = p0+p
2
1+p
2
2 without interaction term by a time-dependent
canonical transformation Cq0 ,
H = Cq0H0C
−1
q0
,
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where
Cq0 = e
−ip2
1
∫
q0
−∞
A2(q′
0
)dq′
0e−iA(q0)p1q2e
2ip1p2
∫
q0
−∞
A(q′
0
)dq′
0 . (11)
The solutions |Ψ〉 of H are given in terms of those |Ψ0〉 of H0 by
|Ψ〉 = Cq0|Ψ0〉.
Assume that particle-1 is initially in an eigenstate of momentum p1, |k〉1,
and that particle-2 is in an eigenstate of momentum p2, |k2〉2, so that
|Ψ0〉 = |k〉1|k2〉2.
The coordinate representation of the solution |Ψ〉 is
〈q1, q2, q0|Ψ〉 = 〈q1, q2, q0|Cq0|k〉1|k2〉2 (12)
=
1
2pi
exp(ikq1 + i(k2 − A(q0)k)q2 − i(k
2 + k22)q0
+i2kk2
∫ q0
−∞
A(q′0)dq
′
0 − ik
2
∫ q0
−∞
A2(q′0)dq
′
0).
The state evolves smoothly from |k〉1|k2〉2 before q0 = 0 to e
iφ(k,k2)|k〉1|k2−k〉2
after q0 = T . A phase φ(k, k2) arises in the evolution and, explicitly,
φ(k, k2) = i2kk2(c1 − T )− ik
2(c2 − T ),
where
c1 =
∫ T
0
A(q′0)dq
′
0
and
c2 =
∫ T
0
A2(q′0)dq
′
0.
The state of particle-2 is correlated with that of particle-1 after the evolution,
and the eigenstate of particle-1 has not been disturbed. A measurement has
been performed.
If particle-1 were initially in the Gaussian superposition of momentum-
eigenstates (6), the measurement would have produced the smooth transition
to a superposition of correlated states
(
(pia/2)−1/4
∫
dke−(k−k)
2/a|k〉1
)
|k2〉2 −→ (13)
(pia/2)−1/4
∫
dke−(k−k)
2/aeiφ(k,k2)|k〉1|k2 − k〉2.
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Suppose one introduces a second observer, particle-3, in the same initial
state |k2〉3 as particle-2, and couples it to particle-1 for an interval after
q0 = T through a term analogous to (8). Given that the result of the first
measurement is k′, i.e. the correlation |k′〉1|k2−k
′〉2, the result of the second
measurement will be the correlated state |k′〉1|k2 − k
′〉2|k2 − k
′〉3. The same
measurement result is obtained, as required.
Let us now consider the role of observables. In the absence of the inter-
action term (8), both p1 and p2 commute with the super-Hamiltonian H0
and are observables. In the presence of the interaction, p2 is no longer an
observable. This is consistent with the fact that the initial state of particle-2,
which is characterized by its eigenvalue with respect to p2, changes during
the interaction. Even though p2 is not an observable, a modification gives an
observable
p˜2 = Cq0p2C
−1
q0
= p2 + A(q0)p1. (14)
The full quantum wavefunction (12) over the whole history of the universe
has the eigenvalue k2 for p˜2 and the eigenvalue k for the observable p1. These
eigenvalues label the state, and they are constants throughout the evolution
of the state. Nevertheless a measurement has been made. There is no loss
of dynamics because one has chosen to work in the frozen formalism.
A closer examination of the relation between observables and dynamics
will be illuminating. Note that p˜2 agrees with p2 when q0 < 0. For this
restricted portion of the universe, p2 is an observable in the sense that it
commutes with the super-Hamiltonian, and it can be used to label states in
this region. This suggests that it is useful to distinguish between a restricted
observable which commutes with the super-Hamiltonian in some region and
a global observable which commutes with the super-Hamiltonian everywhere.
As participants in the universe, we do not of course know the full super-
Hamiltonian which describes it. There will be measurements made in the
future which we cannot anticipate now. Since we only discover the de-
tails of the super-Hamiltonian of the universe as we go along, we cannot
know the global observables which commute with the super-Hamiltonian of
our universe. When we say that the states of subsystems we observe are
in eigenstates of some observables, they are in eigenstates of restricted ob-
servables. For some period of time, those observables commute with the
super-Hamiltonian of the universe, and their eigenstates are unchanging with
respect to eigenstates of other observables that also commute with the super-
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Hamiltonian.
To elaborate on this further, consider the observable p1 which is being
measured. In the example here, it is both an observable in the sense that
it commutes with the super-Hamiltonian and in the sense that a correlation
with its eigenstates is established during the measurement-interaction with
particle-2. I want to emphasize that it is not necessary that p1 commute with
the super-Hamiltonian for all q0, so long as it does so in the neighborhood of
the period of measurement.
Suppose one considers the measurement of p1 when the state of particle-1
at q0 = 0 is the gaussian superposition (6). One could add a q1-dependent
term to the super-Hamiltonian which evolves some initial state of particle-1
into the gaussian superposition and turns off before q0 = 0, when the mea-
surement begins. Or, one could add such a term some time after q0 = T
when the measurement is complete, and the final state of particle-1 in each
correlated state of the superposition would evolve away from a momentum
eigenstate. In each case, the momentum of particle-1 in the gaussian super-
position state at q0 = 0 would still be measured, but p1 would only be a
restricted observable. It would not commute with the super-Hamiltonian if
there were q1-dependent terms present. Not being a global observable means
that the eigenvalue of p1 could not be used as a quantum number for the
wavefunction of the universe, but this is not a serious loss. If one’s pri-
mary concern is with predictions of the outcomes of measurement, restricted
observables are more relevant than global ones.
The nature of observables can be still more closely investigated. At each
instant q0 = t, the state of particle-2 is instantaneously an eigenstate of the
self-adjoint operator p2 with eigenvalue k2−A(t)k. In the ordinary quantum
mechanical sense, p2 is an observable. One can compute expectation values
of it at any time q0, and one thinks of these as predictions of the outcomes
of possible measurements. Now, p2 is not a global observable, and it doesn’t
commute with H at q0 = t when 0 < t < T , so it isn’t always a restricted
observable. Nevertheless, just as q1 at time q0 = t, in the first example, was
made into a global observable above by evolving it with the Hamiltonian, p2
can be made a global observable by applying the canonical transformation
Cq0C
−1
t . The observable is
p2t = Cq0C
−1
t p2CtC
−1
q0
= p2 + A(q0)p1 − A(t)p1. (15)
This gives a family of observables p2t which reduce to the operator p2 at time
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q0 = t of which particle-2 is instantaneously an eigenstate. As the state of the
system evolves through the measurement, the eigenstate of particle-2 changes
at each instant as the observable of which it is the eigenstate changes. In
ordinary quantum mechanics, when one speaks of the self-adjoint operator
p2 as an observable, one is referring to p2t.
Incidentally, this answers Kuchar’s criticism that the Page-Wootters con-
ditional probability interpretation does not give the correct answer for prop-
agators[Kuc92]. The observables for the position at two distinct instants of
time are different, as given by (4). If, at time q0 = T , one wants to pre-
dict the probability of finding the particle at some location at a later instant
q0 = T
′, one must compute the conditional probability that the particle is in
an eigenstate of q1T ′ . If one uses q1T as the position observable for all time,
the particle will not appear to move, as Kuchar rightly argues.
It is generally true that an operator at an instant of time can be pro-
moted into a global observable, and hence one has a family of observables
parametrized by the time. These are Rovelli’s evolving constants of the
motion[Rov89-91]. As these observables change, the eigenstates associated
with them change as well. This change embodies the evolution of states.
One may ask whether these observables are all physically measurable.
That is, can one introduce an observing subsystem that will correlate with
the momentum of particle-2 at time q0 = t for 0 < t < T ? My answer is
no. While one may formally calculate expectation values for the momentum
p2t at these times, these calculations do not refer to the results of any phys-
ical experiment that can be done, in the projection procedure sense. There
are two related difficulties. First, all physical measurements require finite
duration in order to establish correlations between the observing and the
observed subsystems. This is itself a subject requiring further elaboration,
but for the moment suffice it to say that, since the eigenvalue of the operator
p2 is changing, an attempted measurement can at best measure an averaged
value and not the specific momentum at time q0 = t. Moreover, one expects
that no coupling exists which will leave the changing value of p2 undisturbed,
so that the measurement of p1 is unaffected. Secondly, because p2 is dynam-
ically changing, it is impossible to arrange that a second measurement will
find the same result with certainty. One can couple to the observable which
corresponds to the instantaneous momentum eigenstate of particle-2 at time
q0 = t, but as it will obtain an average result over a different interval than
the first measurement, the results will in general be different. This would
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not then be a measurement in the projection procedure sense.
Thus, only restricted observables can be physically measured in the pro-
jection procedure sense. One is led to the conclusion that the assump-
tions about the nature of measurement that lie at the foundation of the
projection procedure are too idealized. By postulating instantaneous non-
disruptive measurement, they both exclude physically relevant measurement-
interactions and allow computations for the outcomes of experiments that
cannot be realized. It is evident that further work on measurement theory
outside the projection procedure framework is necessary.
To close one final loose-end, consider whether the non-self-adjoint observ-
able G (7) can be physically observed. Mathematically, the answer would
seem to be yes: one uses a coupling analogous to (8) with p1 replaced by
G. This would establish a correlation between the state of particle-2 and the
G-eigenstate of particle-1. There is however a difficulty. Since G is a complex
operator, it is not evident that there exists a physical device which can realize
the proposed coupling. This serves to emphasize a very important point. In
the laboratory, we are restricted to a handful of possible interactions. One
must bear in mind that these are the building blocks from which we must
ultimately build our super-Hamiltonian.
The following picture of dynamics in the frozen formalism can be assem-
bled from the foregoing discussion. The full quantum state representing the
“wavefunction of the universe” is fixed once the initial conditions and the
super-Hamiltonian are given. This includes all measurements that will be
made during the course of the universe. Dynamical evolution is a process
that takes place in the form of changes in the decomposition of the full state
into subsystem eigenstates. The wavefunction of the universe need not be
expressed as a product state of eigenstates of its global observables. It may
of course be represented as a superposition of such eigenstates. More gen-
erally it may be represented in terms of eigenstates of operators which are
observables only in restricted regions of the universe, or in terms of eigen-
states of families of global observables parametrized by the time. When the
wavefunction of the universe is expressed in such a fashion, one finds that
as the collection of observables used to decompose the state change, the su-
perposition of eigenstates change. This is what gives us the impression of
dynamical evolution: it is the changing collection of correlations amongst the
eigenstates of restricted observables that constitutes what we observe.
The self-adjoint operators that we speak of in ordinary quantum mechan-
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ics as observables are members of families of global observables parametrized
by the time. Because any measurement made through interactions requires
finite duration to establish correlations between the observing and the ob-
served subsystems, only restricted observables which commute with the super-
Hamiltonian through the period of measurement are physically measurable,
in the projection procedure sense. In particular, this means that one can
compute expectation values for many self-adjoint operators which do not re-
fer to the outcomes of physically realizable experiments. If one is interested
in physics, care must be taken with the use of expectation values. More
importantly, one must appreciate that the projection procedure, which so
strongly colors our perception of quantum mechanics, overly idealizes mea-
surement as instantaneous and non-destructive. Recognizing that a proper
description of measurements within the quantum formalism requires inter-
actions of finite duration is a first step towards resolving the long-standing
conflict over the role of time in quantum mechanics and relativity.
I would like to thank A. Albrecht and C.J. Isham for discussions improving
the presentation of this work.
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